Textile and Apparel: an historical and "glo-cal" perspective. The Italian case from an economic agent's point of view by Michele Tronconi
Liuc Papers n. 176, Serie Economia e Impresa, 45, settembre 2005 
 
1 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
Michele Tronconi 
Contents : 
1)  Introduction: the point of view of an economic agent driven by special interest. 
2)  Textile and Apparel : recent key figures.  
3)  The battle against a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
4)  An historical perspective. 
a)  A classical pattern in economic development. 
b)  A different “flying geese” route.  
c)  A slow decline chronicle. 
5)  Global and local against each other: quota system, tariffs and anti-dumping cases. 
a)  The end of the quota system: China as the winner who takes all. 
b)  The grey cotton fabric anti-dumping case. 
c)  From classical dumping to “social and environmental dumping”. 
6)  Reaching equilibrium between global and local: the case for traceability and reciprocity. 
a)  Traffic lights for international trade. 
b)  If transparency and innovation call for product traceability. 
c)  A case for reciprocity, starting from domestic market. 
7)  Concluding remarks and summery. 
￿  Specific References. 
￿  Others References. 
 Liuc Papers n. 176, settembre 2005 
 
2 
1) Introduction: the point of view of an economic agent driven by 
special interest. 
The  main  subject  of  this  paper
1  is  the  Italian  Textile  and Apparel  Industry  with  reference  to  all 
possible strategies for holding on to competitive advantage
2. The issues I am referring to are presented in 
the chapters which follow and they are, essentially, the structural and strategic aspects at the basis of 
international competition and the case for traceability and reciprocity.  
I would like to stress a simple fact: I am a textile entrepreneur; I’m not an economist, even though I 
make use of terms usually used by economists
3.  
Here I do not seek to analyse what are the main differences between social scientists and economic 
agents, like me. But, please, keep this in your mind when reading this paper. It is not that being driven by 
special interests is wrong, or that it couldn’t be consistent with general interests. To make it simple, it is a 
question of different perspectives.  
I am well aware that some arguments will be treated in a short way or without strong continuity 
between them. This is not a definitive essay, but it is a way to call for debate and reach a better view of a 
changing industry, starting from a different perspective from the usual one which regards the Textile and 
Clothing industry as a sunset one for western Europe. This helps me to better define the subject of this 
paper, seen in an historical and glo-cal perspective. It means we’ll see issues considering their historical 
roots and trying to notice any cyclical pattern. Glo-cal is a new term which reminds us that our heads 
should  always  think  what  is  happening  elsewhere,  but  that  our  feet  are  always  located  somewhere. 
Moreover,  what  is  considered  as  a  consequence  of  globalisation,  could  result  in  a  local  conflict  of 
interests, so that many adjustments should be made at home, more than elsewhere. 
I start by stressing some key figures to set out dimension of the Italian Textile and Apparel industry, 
then I  make reference to historical  patterns and consequent  bias that can come from a deterministic 
approach.  I  recall  macroeconomic  scenario  in  recent  years,  then  I  move  to  analyse  evolution  in 
international  trade,  with  the  surge  of  Chinese  exports.  Anti  -  dumping,  tariffs  and  quotas  are  also 
considered as controversial issues in the search for a new global balance. To reach this, we shouldn’t 
forget that both structural and strategic aspects are always in action when international competition is 
concerned. All in all, transparency is very important and could be supported by product traceability. This 
issue is connected with the difference of standards and the difficulty to make them become a purchasing 
and innovation driver. In fact, the Textile industry shows that environmental and social constraints which 
are  typical  in  most  developed  countries,  like  Italy,  do  not  automatically  stimulate  technological 
innovation. As far as reciprocity is concerned I will point out that it should be better exposed, starting 
from domestic market. 
2) Textile and Apparel : recent key figures. 
To grasp the performance of an industry with respect to the rest of the world we can start by looking at 
the percentage share in world exports, as shown in Figure 1. We discover that Europe (EU-15) in 2002 Michele Tronconi, Textile and Apparel: an historical and "glo-cal" perspective. … 
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has been the world leader, with a share of 34% for Textile and of 25% for Apparel. Second world player 
has been China, with a share of 14% for Textile and of 21% for Apparel.  
If  we consider the evolution of these figures in the last decade, let’s say from 1990 to 2002, we 
discover that Europe has decreased by 15 points in Textile and 13 points in Apparel, meanwhile China 
increased  7 points in Textiles and 12 points in Apparel. Secondly, if we don’t consider Europe as an 
aggregate unit, but single European countries, we see that China is the real world leader with Italy in third 
place as Textile exporters, after the United States, and second place with respect to Apparel, followed by 
Turkey. 
We must also consider imports; we discover that Europe (EU-15) still remains the leader, followed by 
the United States, with China in third place for Textiles, but without any strong relevance with respect to 
Apparel. It means that, for clothing, China is a net exporter.  
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EU 15  30,4%  -16,3  EU 15  42,3%  -10,3 
United States  10,6%  4,4  United States              31,7%  7,7 
China  8,1%  3,2  Japan  8,4%  0,6 
Source:OECD – WTO, International Trade Statistics 2003.     ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
 
The fact that for many countries exports are as important as imports is due to the particular production 
process which can be split – broken into parts - worldwide, generating a lot of international trade, as 
shown in Figure 2. 
As stated by UNCTAD (UNCTAD, 2004), during the last two decades Textiles and Apparel were the 
second most dynamic product in world trade, with an annual export growth rate of 13%, surpassed only 
by electronic and electrical goods, whose exports increased by 16%, annually. 
As  we  will  soon  see,  this  happened  thanks  to  the  contribution  of  developing  countries  and  new 
industrial countries due to a different competitive advantage based on low labour costs, but also because 
of artificial distortions based on duties and quotas in trade between countries. Moreover, we should not 
forget that many developed countries, like Europe, lack raw materials, such as natural fibres, and they 
must import them. So, to take a simple example, fine Indian cotton might be turned into fabric in Italy, cut 
in America, sewn in Honduras and sold back to America. Liuc Papers n. 176, settembre 2005 
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This does not mean that a large part of production could still not take in place in a single country, for 
example because of a major attention to quality and time to market. To better understand all the possible 
locations of production steps, the following features should be stressed. First of all, a production chain 
can be very long and articulated in small phases, in spite of the substantial simplicity of the output. 
Secondly, some phases are capital intensive, like spinning, weaving and finishing, whereas clothing is 
essentially  labour  intensive.  Moreover,  some  processes  need  workers  without  special  skills,  whereas 
human capital might be very important in some other phases, like in finishing. Nonetheless, finishing, 
which includes bleaching, dyeing and printing, must comply with strict environmental standards in some 
developed countries, and this can push production to search for  pollution havens. All these elements have 
played  a role in  defining  different  national  competitive advantage, filtered  by  the  effect  of  artificial 
obstacles to trade and by different national standards. 
 
 
Source : OECD, 2004.￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
 
In some respects, we can say there are three main patterns in action and in competition with each 
other. There is the worldwide fragmented chain, which is usually headed by big retailer in developed 
countries, like Wal-Mart in America; there is the country fragmented chain, which is usually headed by 
an Apparel producer with a brand policy, as happened in Italy, with Marzotto and Benetton. The third 
main pattern is the one which could become more and more important after the end of the quota system; it 
is the regional fragmented chain, based on preferential rules of origin. We can think, for example, of 
NAFTA and the role of Mexico for the United States. This third model is headed by the same actors as 

















Source : Euratex, SMI and ATI on Eurostat and ISTAT data               ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
 
Coming to the Italian success story, we have to stress that Italy has been the leading producer in 
Europe, starting from the end of the seventies. If we compare the Italian sectoral trade balance with that 
of total Europe, as shown in Figure 3, we see Italy with positive results, in the last decade, meanwhile 
Europe had an increasing deficit.  
This is not encouraging enough because if we analyse the data better, from 1990 to 2003, as shown in 
Figure 4, we discover that: 1) production valued in real terms has decreased by nearly 26%; 2) the import 
penetration index, valued on apparent consumption, has more than doubled in nearly ten years, passing 
from 19% to 46%; 3) labour force has decreased by almost 27%. 
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Another ambivalent indicator is given by the share in world exports, as shown in Figure 5, because 
one  might  say  that  it  is  continuously  reducing,  even  though  smoothly  and  without  eliminating  the  
important role played by the Italian industry in global competition.   
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Hence, the Textile and Apparel industry is still very important for Italian economy. For example, it 
represents nearly 1/3 of the manufacturing trade balance and nearly 13% of employment in the national 
industry. As shown in Figure 6, with respect to 2001 data, the added value produced by Textile and 
Apparel plus Leather, in Italy, was nearly equal to the total added value produced by Danish industry, or 
the French transport industry, from cars to airplanes (M. Fortis, 2005).  
In any case, we must observe that in the last few years, the Italian Textile and Apparel industry is 
underperforming as is all Italian industry. A discouraging mix of overvalued ￿uro against the Dollar, lack 
of demand and increasing costs, from energy to unit labour costs, also to cope with the negative effects of 
the changeover, are creating a vicious circle where slow growth is the main result. In this context, where 
all kinds of industries are focused on restructuring - with the exceptions of the heirs of the old national 
monopolies - the traditional sectors, like Textile and Apparel, are suffering from import substitution. 
Especially from China, which is running along a path of economic specialisation similar to the Italian 
one, focused on traditional export-led  industries. 
The  recent accession of China to WTO, at the end of 2001, has added a new and serious dimension to 
the quota phase-out, defined during the Uruguay Round in 1994, when the MFA was replaced by the 
ATC
4. Chinese exports to the EU have grown greatly during the last three years. And as some liberalized 
product areas have grown by three or more times, its prices have plummeted by up to 75%
5. 
 




   Italian T&A + Leather Value Added compared with other European Industries              ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
 
Quoting the last OECD study, what the post-ATC period may offer to countries competing with China 
may be illustrated by what happened to the import composition of Japan, a country that did not apply 
MFA restrictions. Between 1990 and 2002, the share of Japanese clothing imports originating from China 
soared from 31% to 79% (OECD, 2004). Consequently, if this will be the case, European producers and 
especially Italian ones will be pushed out of the market. As stated by a study commissioned by the 
European Commission, a reduction of nearly 30% of jobs is expected in a short time. But what we can 
see, at this very moment, is a sort of over-reaction by Italian producers, which could lead to an even 
worse knock down. In fact, entrepreneurs along the pipeline are reacting to import substitution, drastically 
reducing their own orders to domestic suppliers regardless of the instances, in terms of inventories and 
capital investment, let alone lay-offs.  The trade shock tends to be amplified passing from one step to the 
other  along  the  fragmented  production  chain,  which  is  an  Italian  characteristic.  I  stress  the  point: 
reductions are generalized and have a snow-ball effect. In the process there is no room for discrimination 
between more efficient firms and less efficient ones, relatively speaking. This depends on market signals 
in absolute terms – i.e. import quantity and prices are astonishing. But this means that adjustment does 
not occur through the exit of less efficient firms, leaving space to the more efficient ones. Scale reduction 
is overwhelming and pervasive. Consequently, the Italian Textile Industry as a whole tends to become 
less and less profitable and competitive.   
3) The battle against a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Why is the Italian Textile and Apparel industry declining? Why is it over-reacting, as said above? 
There are four kinds of answers. The first one is typically structural and involves aspects like maturity of 
the sector, globalisation as well as the comparative advantages of new industrial countries in terms of low 
Rilievo dell'industria italiana del tessile-abbigliamento e delle pelli-calzature rispetto ad alcune industrie  
europee: valore aggiunto 2001 (miliardi di euro) 
 
(Fonte: elaborazione Fondazione Edison su dati Eurostat) 
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labour costs. This is the kind of answer which is well analysed by economic essays and that we can take 
for granted. The second answer is partially linked to the first one, it considers the trade shock originated 
by the colossal role of Chinese exports and the consequent current market disruption, in Europe. The third 
answer concerns national and European politics. For example, policy makers in Italy are leaving the 
industry  to  face  open  competition,  on  product  markets,  maintaining  protection  for  many  production 
factors, as in the case of energy, or without supporting industry with appropriate public investment in 
infrastructure. Both the second and the third kind of answers will be considered in the following chapters. 
The fourth answer is a more subtle one because it involves social belief and bias. As I said before, the 
personal beliefs of economic agents are important to explain market behaviour. For sociologists as well as 
for psychologists it couldn’t be the other way round. A classical issue in both disciplines is that what is 
considered as real, produces real effects.  
The point is that both cyclical and structural changes are not only the result of innovation or chance, 
but also the result of general beliefs. The beliefs that people hold determine the choices they make. These 
choices,  in  turn,  structure the  changes  in the  economic framework.  So,  the  way  we  interpret  reality 
influences our taking part in it and in its modification. On some occasions we can observe what is called a 
self-fulfilling prophecy in action. Let’s say that once an expectation is set, even if it isn’t accurate, we tend 
to act in a way that is consistent with that expectation. People with whom we interact tend to respond by 
adjusting their behaviour to match our expectations. The result is that the expectation comes true. This is 
the case for Textiles and Apparel in Italy, nowadays. It started with the new economy euphoria and was 
reinforced by real events during the 2001. The general understanding is that there’s no room for this kind 
of industry in our future, “at home”. Everyone seems to believe so; not only ordinary people but also 
policy makers and entrepreneurs along the pipeline. Some colleagues believe that we can keep our head at 
home, for design and product engineering, but that we must use muscles abroad, where labour cost is 
cheaper.  If taken in an absolute way, this is the end of our formula, based on the integrity of the pipeline 
at home; based on industrial districts and positive externalities. Strange to say it looks as if every one has 
forgotten the dimension of our recent success and the impact of the sector on the Italian economic system 
as a whole. Without forgetting that if so many products are daily sold on the global market counterfeiting 
Italian origin, it is evidently because global consumers are still keen on buying what we can offer them.     
So, at the very base of the actual over-reaction there is the general belief that domestic production no 
longer has a future. It is a belief also based on a deterministic view of economic development. As we’ll 
see in the next chapter, the consequent behaviours are so pervasive and generalised as to amplify the 
shock which everyone is trying to avoid. It is a mixture of rational and irrational attitudes. On the one 
hand, there is the rationality of reducing costs and capacity, in the short run; on the other, there is the 
irrational attitude of stopping investment and avoiding shutting down factories. 
But the origin of the escalation stems from China with its : too much, too soon, too cheap. Michele Tronconi, Textile and Apparel: an historical and "glo-cal" perspective. … 
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4) An historical perspective. 
4.a) A classical pattern in economic development. 
China is feared as the real winner who takes all; at least in world Textiles and Apparel. Someone 
pointed out that Asia  was a  net exporter  of textiles to Britain and West Europe,  until the  Industrial 
Revolution, so perhaps we are merely witnessing the restoration of an earlier pattern of trade (Singleton, 
1997). But also the idea that import substitution could lead to the end of domestic textile industry is not 
new. In Italy, the same fear was reported since the first big crisis occurred long ago, in 1600 (Cipolla, 
1974). It happened as well, at the beginning of the Italian Industrial Revolution, in 1860 (Romani, 1992), 
and then every now and then, till now. So, we could say that there is nothing new under the sun and that 
history can teach us something.  
The textile industry was the archetypal industry of the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth  centuries  in  Britain.  In  some  ways  the  first  industrial  revolution  was  a  textile  revolution 
(Dicken, 2003). Especially cotton spinning and weaving were the object of  technical innovation, in a sort 
of reciprocal reinforcement (Figure 7). For example, one of the first innovation was the “flying shuttle”, 
by John Kay, in 1733. The consequent improvement in productivity of looms created a demand pull for 
better productivity in spinning, as well
6. So, a second important innovation took place in this field with 
the so called “spinning jenny”, by James Hargreaves, in 1764. The third step was to replace human 
energy with hydraulics systems, and so on with a sequence of mechanization and better usage of energy, 
where steam marked the real beginning of the new era. It marked, even though progressively, the passage 
from the earlier so called domestic system to the new factory system. The reason is “easy” to understand
7, 
the cost of steam apparatus was very much the more expensive and forced the search for economies of 
scale through the physical concentration of looms in a single place. This path, based on mechanization, 
concentration in factories and mass production, was used for cotton, as well as for wool. Britain tried the 
same  for  silk,  but  France  with  its  specialised  district  in  Lyon  became  the  real  leader,  both  in  the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The most important thing is that this leadership was obtained with a 
totally different approach to industrialisation
8. Instead of the passage from the domestic system to the 
factory  system,  there  was  better  regulation  and  organisation  of  the  former  in  what  someone  called 
“collective manufacture” (Cottereau, 1997).  Lyon, with silk, developed an industrial pattern which was 
more flexible and based on product differentiation. It rested on fragmentation of the pipeline headed by 
the merchant-entrepreneur. The same pattern is still at work, in some respects, in some Italian districts, 
like Prato. We could stress that textiles was not only at the origin of industrialization, but also of its main 
dialectic, with mass production on one side and flexible specialisation, on the other. Silk did not follow 
the cotton path, whereas just now cotton and all other fibres are following the old silk path in developed 
countries, with the help of design and fashion. I’d like to stress the point: Italian Textiles and Apparel has 
based its success on flexible specialisation  as a way to cope with saturated markets, where needs are 
“socially” stimulated. Moreover, it should be noted that along the Italian pipeline many fibres are treated, 
like cotton, silk, linen, wool and man-made fibres. We could say that it is a case not only of flexible 
specialisation, but of a versatile and complete one, as well. Liuc Papers n. 176, settembre 2005 
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Coming  back  to  England,  historical  reconstruction  is  interesting  not  only  because  the  “textile 
revolution”  started  there,  but  also  because  England  has  been  the  first  country  where  manufacturing  
decreased  its  relevance  to  the  national  economy,  as  happened  over  the  period  1950  to  1980.  Many 
observers say that England was the example to imitate for industrial take off and could be the same about 
landing. It could be a paradigmatic example, consistent with the so called development cycle hypothesis. 
As we’ll discuss later, most nations go through a cycle in which first agriculture and then manufacturing 
decline  as  the  tertiary  service  sector  expands.  Usually,  an  important  component  of  this  path  is    the 
relevance of competition from imports. We could say that first comers decrease because of new comers 
development. But as there were reasons why industrial revolution took off in England and not elsewhere, 
there could have been reasons for the decline of industrial sectors that could not be present in other 
countries. For some scholars (Jones, 2002), there is a relatively close correlation between the list of 
factors held to have been responsible for the development in the UK manufacturing sector as a whole and 
those responsible for the decline of the Textile and Apparel sectors. For example, an over-concentration 
on low quality and undifferentiated goods. The dominance of the multiple retailers, especially Marks & 
Spencer, made it difficult for manufacturers to establish their own brands and tended to reinforce the 
industry’s attachment  to  long  runs  of relatively  undifferentiated  products (Jones,  2002).  In  the  same 
period, European consumers were looking for more and more differentiated, colourful and stylish fabrics. 
This called for flexibility as well as for synergy in the pipeline to become a real supply chain and reach 
quick response to changing fashions. That is exactly what became the base for success in the Italian case. 
Due to this comparison, Richard Jones (Jones, 2002) stresses the failure of the UK Textile and Apparel 
manufacturing sectors to achieve meaningful inter-connectedness and co-operation. So to speak, it is 
possible to track similarities in development cycles as well as diversities. And when diversity arises, in 
terms of different strategies, first comer behaviour should not necessarily forecast the future of others. 
 
 
     Source : OECD, 2004￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿Michele Tronconi, Textile and Apparel: an historical and "glo-cal" perspective. … 
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4.b) A different “flying geese” route. 
I refer here to certain historical patterns which if taken in an oversimplified and deterministic way, 
could create dangerous bias. For example, there is a logical overlap between development stages and 
basic sector definitions; primary, for agriculture; secondary for manufacturing and tertiary for services. 
This can be interpreted in a simplistic way as a linear and deterministic approach to development. It is 
true that this sequence corresponds to the stages in human history, taken as a whole. It is also true that, for 
example,  in  newly  industrialised  countries  agriculture  has  become  less  and  less  important,  whereas 
manufacturing becomes the main sector for employment. This doesn’t mean that primary and secondary 
sectors should disappear in most developed countries. Employment tends to decrease due to a progressive 
change in social structure, social welfare and social needs. Consumption patterns change and this drives 
production as well as import and export flows. But the reduction of employment is often offset by growth 
in  productivity.  This  happened  in  Textiles,  in  Italy,  as  shown  in  Figure  8.  This  is  consistent  with 
technological innovation and the partial trade off from labour to capital factor intensity.  
Coming back to historical patterns of development and to the deterministic approach they can involve, 
I would like to refer to the one proposed by Akamatsu (Singleton, 1997). He advanced a flying geese 
pattern of industrial development, in which industries take off and fly, one after another, in a long line. 
Textiles are normally the first industry to become airborne because it requires only modest amounts of 
skill and capital. Heavier and more sophisticated industries follow in series. During the course of the 
flight, latecomers assume the leadership of the flock of geese, so that the Textile industry falls further and 























￿￿ Source : ISTAT,  ATI￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿











































































Labour Force)Liuc Papers n. 176, settembre 2005 
 
12 
This pattern was seen in action in many developed countries, like in Japan. It is often respected by 
new industrial countries, like the four Asian tigers and especially South Korea. But in the case of Italy the 
pattern was not completely respected, because Textiles and Apparel still remain in a leading position, 
determining overall economic performance. This persistence is seen as a problem, but we can start from 
that to better understand Italian Textile and Apparel, due to its special fragmented structure which is 
complete and flexible, at the same time. Fragmentation is recomposed within the industrial districts with 
their social sense of belonging, contextual knowledge, specialisation and informal integration (Becattini, 
2000; Quadrio Curzio and Fortis, 2001). It’s what we refer to as external economies of scale which are 
one of the main keys to really understand differences in economic performance between countries. In 
Italy, we don’t have only the persistence of Textile, but there are other traditional industries which are 
linked in mutual reinforcement to characterise and differentiate our national economy. I refer to shoes, 
furniture and food that taken as a whole are consistent with the so called Italian way of life. I stress the 
point, because what we really export are products which are valued much more for intangible reasons – 
like aesthetics and emotional transfer, promoted by advertisement and reputation – than for material 
consistency  
Coming back to the flying geese pattern, the persistence of something which should no longer be 
present can be seen as an exception to a scientific paradigm; it can be seen as a door open to a better 
comprehension of reality. As long as this persistence produces good results it is greatly celebrated, both 
inland and abroad. But as soon as performances tend to decrease, like nowadays, the old paradigm regains 
at home its strength, covering every disturbance signal
9. : it was the reality to be wrong, not the theory. 
“The Italian Textile and Apparel industry should have died long before”. This is a common opinion, 
because the industry is suffering from international competition. Many observers, as well as many policy 
makers, believe that this is totally normal, without considering the many causes which are interfering with 
the normal activity of the supply chain. So, the risk we are running, now, is that the misunderstanding 
about the persistence of the Textile and Apparel industry, in Italy, could lead to the wrong strategy (or to 
no strategy at all). 
4.c) A slow decline chronicle. 
Those ones who are used to think with a deterministic approach to development could ask how we can 
survive the import substitution which is more and more in action, especially from China, not only in our 
country but also in our target export countries, like Germany and the USA. 
I’d like to summarize recent events which brought us to the present situation, even though this implies 
the risk of oversimplifying.  
Before the end of the quota system, the Italian Textile and Apparel industry was affected by a self-
fulfilling  prophecy, recalled in  the  third  chapter.  It  started  with  the  new  economy  euphoria  and  was 
reinforced by real events during the 2001. In the USA this was the year when the financial bubble burst; 
orders to the Italian Textiles and Apparel industry immediately decreased. The reduction of trade between 
Italy and the USA was even stronger after the 9/11, with the Twin Tower shock. 2001, in mid December, Michele Tronconi, Textile and Apparel: an historical and "glo-cal" perspective. … 
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was also the year when China joined (or re-joined) the WTO. As I said earlier, the consequence of this 
new entry became evident in the next year; the same one which characterized the Italian economy with 
the changeover, from national currencies to the Euro. We should not forget the efforts made to comply 
with the Mastricht Treaty, during the nineties. They reduced the rate of national growth, but after that, the 
changeover  produced  some  sort  of  a  poverty  effect,  because  of  the  real  rate  of  exchange  in  pricing 
consumer  products. Not only in  Italy, but also  in  other  European countries, where different national 
causes were also under way. An example is Germany, with the side effects of reunification. The general 
consequence was – and still it is – a very low rate of growth for the European economy. Italian Textile 
and Apparel was doubly affected, firstly by the lack of demand from American markets, then from the 
lack of internal demand, mainly from Germany.  
In 2003 the Dollar began to depreciate markedly against the Euro. This made exports more and more 
difficult, on the other hand, imports from China became more and more easy. Recent history for Europe, 
in economic terms is a slow down; for China it is exactly the opposite. With big differences in absolute 
size, especially if we consider specific competition in traditional sectors, between China and Italy.   
As a consequence of what has just been said, we have, on the one hand, low demand, on the other, 
large  supply  from  Chinese  producers.  Lower  prices  will  achieve  equilibrium,  giving  a  signal  to  the 
European economic system to produce fewer traditional products and more of other things. But what if 
the market signals are artificially sustained? What about time and social costs for adjustment? What about 
innovation as a way to find new ways to compete? Last but not least, why didn’t Italian industry react 
earlier to the Chinese on rush? 
Starting from the last question, we cannot say that the Italian Textile and Apparel industry did not face 
increasing global competition through investment and restructuring. As shown in the last paragraph the 
industry has been characterized by a continuous growth in productivity which has entailed a reduction of 
employment. The signals which came from the markets, in terms of export share and profitability, were 
encouraging  enough  all  through  the  nineties.  The  alarming  indicators  about  future  development 
mentioned earlier weren’t strong enough to spur a larger and socially expensive downsizing. So, when 
someone points out that we had ten years to prepare ourselves, after the real end of the MFA, it sounds as 
a weak argument. As I just said: firstly, because we have never stopped facing global competition and in 
so  doing  we  obtained  good performances. Secondly,  because those performances didn’t  justify  more 
downsizing. Finally, as to the Chinese giant, we didn’t have ten years but only three, because China re-
joined the WTO at the very end of 2001. This is the reason why in the protocol signed on that occasion 
the possibility for safeguard measures against market disruption, caused by Chinese exports was included.  
Innovation has been a key element to keep competitive advantage. This was done especially at the 
fashion product level as well as at the pipeline organisation level, to ensure quick response and total 
coverage of the product range. It was not the same for technological and process innovation, where long 
term involvement is requested, starting by supplier sectors, like the chemical and mechanical industry. 
This fact will be better analysed later, discussing transparency and traceability. But here it is important to 
stress that markets – especially industrial ones, where new technology is implicitly traded – may come to 
the conclusion that the domestic textile and apparel industry has no future. In this very case no one will Liuc Papers n. 176, settembre 2005 
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spend resources anymore – i.e. R&D – to try to guarantee differential competitive advantage through 
technical innovation. If the actual market signals are so strong – as in the case of market disruption – that 
innovation is no longer regarded as an opportunity, the only possible reaction will be a destructive one. 
We will not have, simply, a capacity reduction to a certain percentage, but a widespread withdrawal. 
As just said, the reaction to strong price pressure, in the near future, can be only a passive one by 
domestic firms, like dramatic downsizing.  But if the slow growth characteristic become pervasive for the 
economy as a whole, it will means that the labour force exiting the Textiles and Apparel industry will not 
find a new jobs in other sectors, swelling the ranks of long-term unemployment. If downsizing is likely to 
happen for other manufacturing sectors, the economy can enter a period of recession. Chinese products 
will become even cheaper, but families won’t have enough purchasing power and the economy will enter 
a vicious circle.  
So, what if all this happens because of market signals sustained artificially? This can force us to 
enforce trade regulations, even though many can see it as a form of protectionism against typical gains 
from free trade
10.  
5) Global and local against each other: quota system, tariffs and anti-
dumping cases. 
5.a) The end of the quota system : China as the winner who takes all. 
China represents a problem for the Italian Textile and Apparel mainly because of the overall effect of 
structural differences (but not only). The problem is not only an Italian one. With the completion of  the 
phase out of quotas, which happened at the end of last year (2004), China is becoming the winner who 
takes all, because also other international competitors in new  
 
             
Textile and clothing machinery imports, value share.
World China Turkey Mexico
USD Millions % % %
2002 17.671            15% 8% 2%
2001 17.948            11% 3% 3%
2000 19.242            8% 5% 4%
1999 17.399            6% 3% 4%
1998 20.163            4% 6% 4%
1997 22.888            7% 8% 3%
1996 23.335            9% 10% 2%
1995 24.240            9% 6% 1%
1994 21.514            9% 3% 2%
Source : OECD, 2004  
                                                                                                           ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿Michele Tronconi, Textile and Apparel: an historical and "glo-cal" perspective. … 
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industrial countries or developing ones, are being flattened. In fact, if the quota system was a limit to 
the most aggressive countries, like China, it acted as a sure export market for weaker competitors, like 
Bangladesh, Cambodia, Sri Lanka or Mauritius.  China had a dramatic rate of growth in recent years 
based on traditional export-led sectors, with Textiles and especially Clothing in a leading position. This 
kind of growth was also supported by foreign direct investment, which improved with WTO accession. 
The phase out of the quota system acted as an incentive for investment in the sector, as shown in Figure 9, 
expanding Chinese capacity. This expansion was also driven by the expectation that demand for textile 
and clothing goods was about to increase worldwide, and especially in the USA and in Europe
11. That 
belief  is  turning  out  to  be  ill-founded  with  respect  to  Europe  because  demand  is  not  increasing  as 
expected, due to low economic growth. Hence, there is excess capacity exported from China with strong 
pressure on prices in European markets, which tends to push out domestic producers. If we consider all 
this alone, we could not understand the picture. Because, at the same time, undervaluation of the Dollar 
and  the  Renminbi,  as  well  as  others  structural  and  strategic  aspects,  are  in  action.  Competition  is 
impossible because imports  prices from China, in ￿, are 50% to 75% cheaper than domestic  goods, 
mainly because of currency reasons. It is interesting to remember that when China rejoined the WTO, at 
the end of 2001, the rate of exchange was nearly 0,89 US Dollar for a ￿, whereas at the beginning of 2005 
the rate of exchange was up 50%, being 1,31! As is known, the Chinese currency, the Renminbi, is 
pegged to the Dollar and undervalued against it by nearly 15 to 30 per cent, as reported by The Economist 
(October 2004). It means that the undervaluation of the Dollar against the ￿ was automatically transferred 
to the Renminbi.  
Here  we  have  also  to  pay  attention  to  a  “suspicion”  about  unfair  practices  made  by  Chinese 
authorities, for example, in terms of hidden subsidies to exporters. It was reported too that there existed a 
double exchange rate system; the official one for foreigners, and one for the exporters, with a premium 
spread  of  nearly  20%  in favour  of  the  latter. Considering  this  kind  of  mechanism,  or  a similar  one 
concerning public subsidies, we could say that Chinese exporters don’t sell products; they buy dollars, at 
any rate, to re-sell them conveniently to the Public Authority.  
Figure 10 – US $ per 1 ￿ 
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The overall effect, I was referring  to earlier, which  makes competition  nearly  impossible against 
Chinese exports, due to unbearable low prices, could be divided between structural aspects and strategic 
ones, as depicted in Figure 11. 
 
 
    Why Chinese Products are dirt cheap
STRUCTURAL  STRATEGIC 
  ASPECTS   ASPECTS
1) Low Labour Cost 1) Public Subsidies
2) Lower Labour Standards 2) Undervaluation
3) Lower Environmental Std.s 3) Soft Budget Costraints
4) Overcapacity 4) Counterfeiting
     Export - led Growth -  Buying Dollars, at any rate 
   (in terms of export prices)
All in all, is it fair trade !?
 
                                                                                                                                              Figure 11 
 
 
As a result, overall Chinese textile and clothing exports to the EU grew by 46,5% in value between 
January 2004 and January 2005 according to China’s own export figures. In some categories of product, 
increases in volume of 625% were registered into the EU-15 with price falls of 36%. This happened, for 
example, for jerseys and pullovers. We can say that January’s evidence showed blockbuster gains for 
Chinese  textile  and  apparel  makers,  but  it  means  exactly  the  contrary  for  all  other  manufacturing 
countries and especially for Italy.  
Economists are used to saying that there are also big gains for consumers, which could make up for 
trade shocks. But if we look at some statistical data about import pricing and consumer pricing, for 
garments, as shown in the Figure 12, we discover that the former decreased strongly, but the latter tended 
to increase, at least in Italy, as well as in many other European countries. The only exception is the UK. 
As stated by The Economist: “Britain and America have enjoyed a sharp decline in the price of clothes in 
recent years. But in the Euro area clothes prices have not fallen; like for like, they are now one-third 
higher than in Britain” (October 2004).  
The question remains the same: where is the consumer benefit and who is actually benefiting from 
lower import prices? Certainly, more transparency along the pipeline down to the consumer could be the 
solution. 
 Michele Tronconi, Textile and Apparel: an historical and "glo-cal" perspective. … 
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CONSUMER 
PRICES     IMPORT PRICES
Country Clothing and 
Footwear Textile Clothing
Italy 7,0% -4,4% -19,0%
Germany -0,7% -8,4% -20,8%
United Kingdom -22,9% -29,7% -12,5%
E.U. - 15 -1,1% -24,2% -39,2%
E.U. - 25 -1,2% -12,9% -22,9%
Analysis of prices 2004 relative to 2000.
Source : Euratex, on Eurostat data.  
                                                                                                    ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿
5.b) The grey cotton fabric antidumping case 
When we face ever lower prices we are used to consider the existence of dumping as an intentional 
foreign firm’s strategy. In the previous paragraph about China, dumping was not listed as a strategic 
aspect because in this very case the underlying structural aspects can be much more relevant. But a better 
analysis of what is considered as dumping can help us to assume a different perspective about trade 
matters. They are not only quarrels between different countries, but they involve, first of all, different 
interests “at home”. 
My  personal  convictions  about  dumping  took  shape  in  the  field,  taking  sides  against  a  specific 
antidumping dossier
12. I’m referring to the antidumping case against the grey cotton fabric coming from 
six new industrial countries – that is China, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Egypt and Turkey - proposed 
twice during the nineties before the European Commission by the associations of European weavers. In 
that same period I was in charge of both the national and the European association for textile finishers and 
my personal concern was that the protection asked by some could become a greater damage for others, 
that is, for finishers as well as for apparel makers. For this reason I reacted against the weavers with some 
counter arguments. I also claimed that I was in favour of the antidumping duties on the condition that 
these were extended to all products, like an umbrella protecting the entire industrial pipeline. Mine was a 
sort of ambivalence which is typical of this kind of matter. We shouldn’t forget that we are mainly 
transformers. We have to import raw materials and commodities, to be able to produce specialities and 
export them. But eventually, the added value incorporated in imports can be ambivalent: on one side, 
importers of that product can be favoured; but not so all the other operators along the pipeline.  For this 
reason  the  anti-dumping  cases  are  mainly  an  internal  dispute  between  different  actors  of  the  same 
domestic market. For this purpose, it is interesting to quote Jacob Viner of Chicago University, who 
wrote in the 1923 one of the leading studies about dumping. He said that :  “as early as the beginning of 
the 19th century, English manufacturers of cotton cloth attempted to induce Parliament to stop English Liuc Papers n. 176, settembre 2005 
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spinners  from  dumping  yarns  abroad  at  “miserable  prices”,  because  “the  foreign  manufacturers  of 
cotton fabrics were thereby afforded an unfair monopoly”” 
13.  
For many economists the phenomenon of dumping is something which doesn’t exist and if it does it 
cannot  really  harm.  With  the  exception  of  some  rare  cases  of  predatory  pricing  (Hindley,  1991). 
Theoretically speaking the notion that low prices charged by one seller may be predatory, and against the 
interests of both other sellers and buyers, has a simple foundation. It is the idea that a producer may find it 
worthwhile to sell a product so cheaply that his competitors are forced out of business. The low price firm 
then will have a monopoly, and can raise the price of the product, thereby increasing profits and covering 
any losses that derived from the initial cheap sales. Buyers will gain in the low-price phase, but will be 
worse off thereafter. Predatory pricing does not require an international setting but mostly referred to it. 
In this view, antidumping action is against production coming from some specific foreign country, and it 
is in the interests of domestic buyers as well, of course, as in the interests of domestic producers of the 
dumped good. Antidumping duties are fixed consistently to what is calculated as a dumping margin; in so 
doing the price of the product coming from abroad becomes as expensive as the one produced locally. 
Even though the explanation is as simple as that, many economists believe that predatory dumping is 
more a theoretical option than a real one.   
My  personal  point  of  view  is  that  predatory  pricing  may  occur  but  it  is  unlikely  to  happen  if 
considered at factory level, as it should be, technically speaking. This may occur only if someone can 
count on big financial resources to implement
14 it. It could be different if we consider the industrial 
strategy of a country, as a whole, because in this case predatory pricing could be supported by some kind 
of subsidies or by the so called soft budget constraints in state-owned factories. In any case, what I 
believe in is that dumping-effect can be something more structural and less dependent on foreign firms’ 
strategy. We can have, for example, a situation of excess capacity in which most of the firms in an 
industry  fail  to  cover  their  average  costs  of  production.  Then  there  are  things  which  involve  big 
differences  between  countries,  with  respect  to  social  and  environmental  standards  or  currencies.  An 
overall effect of all of these can be observed against the European textile and apparel industry with 
respect to the competition from China. In fact we see, currently, that products coming from there are 
imported at ever lower prices which, in many cases, hardly exceed the cost of the raw material they are 
made up with.  
It could be interesting to recall the conclusion of the grey cotton fabric antidumping case. Admitting 
the claim by the cotton weavers, at the beginning of the 1997, the European Commission imposed so 
called “provisional antidumping duties” on imports of grey cotton fabrics from China and the other five 
mentioned countries. As a consequence, there was a contraction in imports of grey cotton fabrics with a 
more than compensative increment in imports of bleached cotton fabrics. As a matter of fact, the import 
volume  of  grey  cotton  decreased  by  45%,  meanwhile  the  import  volume  of  bleached  cotton  fabrics 
increased by 160%! As foreseen, limiting the imports of basic products resulted in a stimulus to import 
semi-processed  and  finished  goods,  thereby  doubling  the  alleged  damage  for  domestic  industry. 
Importing a finished product means taking work away both from weaving and from dyeing plants. This 
becme more and more evident, giving a better indication of what really was the Community interest, Michele Tronconi, Textile and Apparel: an historical and "glo-cal" perspective. … 
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aimed at protecting employment along the pipeline. So the EU Ministers Council finally decided against 
the antidumping duties in the October 1998. We can say, anyhow, that a big mistake was made. The 
artificial boundaries to import at a basic level stimulated new industrial countries to invest resources for 
producing more added value goods. It is another element to be stressed: textile and apparel imports into 
Europe have been much more a demand pull event than an offer push.  
5.c) From classical dumping to “social and environmental dumping”. 
We can refer to other forms of dumping like social and environmental ones, as something different 
from predatory pricing. Most economists disagree about the real existence of this kind of dumping, or 
about its real negative effect. For example, in a WTO dictionary of trade policy terms (WTO, 2003) is 
said that “environmental dumping” does not impact because the cost of compliance to environmental 
regulation in developed countries does not exceed 2% of a good’s value. This could be true as an overall 
average.  But  if  we  take  European  Textile  and  Apparel  industry  we  discover  that  the  incidence  of 
environmental  costs  is  higher,  due  to  specific  command-and-control  regulations.  The  incidence  is 
particularly relevant if we value it, not through the normal accounting system, but through so called 
“environmental accounting”. The latter takes into account also all the hidden costs connected with every 
aspect of production, in compliance with environmental regulations. For example, the differential costs 
using very refined chemicals which are not only more expensive but also less available.  
Social dumping is much more controversial, because economists refer to it only in the case of hard 
labour  by  convicted  people.  Industrialists  and  Unions,  on  the  contrary,  claim  its  existence  in  new 
industrial countries because of different labour standards, with reference to working conditions, freedom 
of association etc. But leaving the controversy to its nominal aspect, the problem could be seen as this. 
We have improved our social protection system as well as the working environment, the toxicological 
protection for consumers and the environmental protection in a gradual way, even with some social 
contrast. To comply with all these aspects means to cover higher costs, which we internalise while others 
can externalise them. So, the cost of production is structurally different. We could discuss the real entity 
of dumping as a complex phenomenon, but the problem remains a general one, even if it is more sensitive 
for some sectors. Can we say that others are more competitive only because they can do things we are not 
allowed to? Can we say that we are less competitive, now, because we cannot externalise costs anymore?  
6) Reaching equilibrium between global and local: the case for 
traceability and reciprocity. 
6.a) Traffic lights for international trade. 
Even though some reasons for the decline, in Italian Textile and Apparel, are of domestic origin, the 
shock coming from international trade is now the main emergency. It is not something completely new, as 
I said, and a second best approach should be considered as an acceptable one. Economists say that the 
first best policy, generally, would be a purely domestic policy targeted directly at market imperfections or Liuc Papers n. 176, settembre 2005 
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distortions. Trade policy is almost always a second best, but it could be more time effective, leaving the 
possibility for gradual internal solutions. The Chinese figures we referred to earlier, demonstrate that a 
clear  and  present  danger  to  Italian  Textile  and  Apparel  manufacturers  is  under  way.  This  calls  for 
immediate safeguard action by the EU. We could say that second best, in this case, is like reintroducing a 
traffic light to regulate excessive trade and its consequent market disruption. It stands for a signal given 
both internally and externally. Internally, it could help the manufacturer to resume confidence. Externally, 
it  could  be  interpreted  as  the  ability  to  react  to  the  effect  of  structural  and  strategic  aspects,  like 
overcapacity and undervaluation, dumping or subsidies, as well as counterfeiting, from China.  
The “special textile safeguard clause” is regulated under Article 242 of the protocol of accession of 
China to WTO. It allows a WTO member to take safeguard action to limit the growth of Chinese exports 
in  cases  where  market  disruption  threatens  to  prevent  the  orderly  development  of  trade.  It  means, 
practically, the provisional restoration of some quotas to be applied to some customs categories of textile 
and apparel products.  
On the 9th March 2005 Euratex sent to the European Commission services requests for safeguard 
action for 12 categories of products, from Jerseys and pullovers, to trousers. This was also meant to 
underline  an  omission.  The  new  Commissioner  for  Trade  had  not  yet  undersigned  the  European 
guidelines for the implementation of the special safeguard clause, even though the former Commission 
had promised its issue before the end of the quota system. The guidelines were decided only on 6th of 
April 2005 (2005/C 101/02 - OJEU 27.04.2005) and  just three weeks later the  Trade Commissioner 
officially opened the investigation into 9 categories of products (2005/C 104/07 – OJEU 29.04.2005). 
This because the data of the first quarter of the 2005, compared with the same period the year before 
showed a growth in volume up to +543% in certain Chinese product exports to the European Union at 
prices which have fallen by up to -47%.  
Referring to the special textile safeguard clause a strong conflict of interest is under way in Europe 
and involves trade policy as a whole. Some countries, like Italy, France, Spain and Portugal are urging the 
implementation  of safeguard  measures.  Others,  like  Great Britain and  the Nordic  countries,  strongly 
oppose them. The formers still have a domestic Textiles and Apparel industry, on the contrary to the 
others, who fear retaliation in other kinds of business with China, or simply because they make big profits 
trading very cheap Chinese products.  
It  is  certainly  true  that  China  is  a  big  and  improving  market,  which  represents  an  important 
opportunity for all kinds of European industries. It is also clear that one cannot export without importing, 
and vice versa. But the question involves economic structural differences. Not only between Italy and 
China, but also inside the European Union. For instance, can the EU with its single currency cope with a 
strong industrial decline as well as a mounting trade deficit in a single member country, as might be the 
case for Italy? The problems with the Italian Textile and Apparel industry cannot be treated solely as 
national ones. We dare say that some traffic lights should be placed to regulate not only trade, but also 
national interests in Europe. 
It is also evident that we cannot face structural problems only through safeguards, which are intended 
as temporary. The kind of intervention to reinforce industrial competitiveness, without affecting European Michele Tronconi, Textile and Apparel: an historical and "glo-cal" perspective. … 
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consumers, but reinforcing their rights, require a better transparency of markets and more substantial 
reciprocity. 
6.b) If transparency and innovation call for product traceability
15. 
The case for traceability arises from the need for transparency and innovation. Generally speaking, we 
have to face the fact that in Europe, and especially in Italy, there is insufficient capacity to turn new 
knowledge into value-creating new or improved products, services and industrial processes. This was 
clearly stated in the Communication dated December 2002 on “Industrial Policy in an Enlarged Europe” 
by the European Commission.  
The situation in the textile industry, in this context, is extremely significant. There is a low level of 
basic  innovation  propensity  in  general.  This is  true, in  view  of  R&D  investments  made by  supplier 
industries, such as the chemical industry and the textile-machinery industry, and also if one considers the 
acquisition of new technologies by textile companies. In other words, if the technology push is low on the 
one hand, on the other there is no demand pull.  The question here is: “Why doesn’t the market succeed in 
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This low innovation propensity derives from a number of market dynamics mentioned above. On the 
one hand, the strong expansion of the Asian textile industry, also as a result of the gradual elimination of 
the quota system. On the other hand, production requirements in newly-industrialised countries differ 
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These different production requirements, which are summed up in Figure 15, also steer the demand 
for technology in another direction. In newly-industrialised countries, this demand is aimed at achieving 
economies of scale that can be obtained using traditional methods. In Italy instead, as well as in all 
European countries, the needs of producer companies are focused on eco-toxicological issues and on 
safety in the workplace, on quick response and on the need to obtain high economies of scope. In these 
cases, traditional technology is no longer an efficient solution.  
As a result, supplier industries, such as the European textile machinery industry and especially the 
chemical industry, are concentrating their efforts solely on the exploitation of consolidated technologies, 
since their goal is to sell in emerging countries. It is a cash cow strategy since it generates significant 
liquidity. This strategy is also justified because the general feeling is that the textile industry is bound to 
decline in the old Europe and therefore will not be a sufficiently interesting market in the future.  
The European chemical industry is acting in a very rational way. Why should it look for new ways of 
satisfying a more and more demanding, but falling need, when it can easily satisfy vast markets with its 
consolidated technology?  With our rising costs and the pressure of imported products, even the textile 
industry has a short-term view, and does not want to face new technological challenges.  
All  this  is  also  happening  because  we  still  have  not  found  effective  ways  of  transforming  our 
constraints into new competitive assets. As a matter of fact, we are not doing enough to highlight the 
efforts that our industry is making each day to respect the environment, the health of consumers and the 
dignity of workers. The achievement of the life-cycle thinking philosophy that lies at the basis of many 
regulations, is not visible to consumers nor is it a purchase driver. Furthermore, the growing number of 
these regulations – which is currently the case in Europe – could generate only higher production costs, to 





DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF TECHNOLOGY IN THE EUROPEAN TEXTILE INDUSTRY
User Sector : Textile Industry
Why doesn't the market succeed in stimulating the
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Global competition can be compared to a hurdle race. When the others keep theirs low, we continue to 
raise ours. Then, we let the ones with the lowest costs be the market winners. Without forgetting that 
often low import prices do not mean low consumer prices, as we saw earlier. Therefore, the losses for 
domestic producers are not offset by benefits for consumers.  
The real problem remains: we do not have effective systems that reward people who compete by 
upgrading. This, in turn, is not stimulating anybody to innovate basic technologies, that is, to look for new 
ways of upgrading and of moving faster. How can we trigger a virtuous circle, starting from greater 
market transparency and reaching the point  of re-launching the technological challenge in Europe to 
obtain more eco-compatible and socially – fair processes and products? 
In the field of textiles and clothing, where the production chain is long and can even be broken down 
geographically, the simplest idea is to make the history of a product visible through traceability. I am 
referring to a simplified traceability, as shown in Figure 16.  This could be based on a self-certification 
system that can be controlled under existing regulations, such as European Council Regulation 2913/92. 
Traceability would highlight the cultural and regulatory contexts where the main phases of production 
took place. This would allow consumers to make an overall assessment of the product, as a result of the 
reputation of the country of origin.  
The hoped-for introduction, by the European Community of the  compulsory Made in …label, similar 
to  what  already  exists  in  the  USA,  is  just  the  first  step  towards  traceability.  Yet  it  could  have  the 
immediate  effect  of  increasing  consumer  confidence  towards  a  more  selective  and  discerning 
           The Textile Industry
Europe  NIC's
(e.g. Italy) (e.g. China)
Structural aspects   Fragmented and Specialised   Vertical integration
Structural advantages External economies of scale;Clusters Raw Materials; Low Current Costs
Average company size   Small and Medium Large
Product orientation Specialities & Service Commodities
Strategic orientation  Quick - response  Cost leadership
Type of market Niche Mass
Type of production    Small batches (lots)   Large batches (lots)
Economies sought   Economies of scope   Economies of scale
Social-environmental limits High Low
Negative externalities Low HighLiuc Papers n. 176, settembre 2005 
 
24 
consumption. Furthermore, it would be a stimulus to updating our customs offices, which, instead of 
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The  Textile  industry  shows  that  environmental  and  social  constraints  which  are  typical  in  most 
developed  countries,  like  Italy,  do  not  automatically  stimulate  technological  innovation.  Present-day 
market incentives are not sufficient enough. I would like to point out that the lack of incentives for 
innovation and for compliance with social and environmental standards, can have the opposite effect, by 
forcing production to relocate to pollution havens.  
In  order  to  rectify  this  sort  of  market  failure  based  on  missing  incentives  for  innovation,  more 
visibility  must  be  given  to  the  origin  of  products,  through  traceability.  This  would  promote  market 
transparency,  support  consumers  and  the  correct  behaviour  of  those  producing  without  negative 
externalities.  
6.c) A case for reciprocity, starting from domestic market. 
Reciprocity is something embedded in the GATT and in the present-day WTO. Technically speaking, 
it implies that during rounds of negotiations for reduction of tariffs each country will make equivalent 
tariff concessions.  It is consistent with the multilateral approach to trade matters. In recent years, the 
appeal for reciprocity has spilled over into a demand for “levelling the playing field”. This occurs because 
TRACEABILITY: BASIC SCHEME
for Textiles and Apparel
    A  REFERENCE  EXAMPLE:
Item description
    To be extended to n* yarns.
    To be extended to n* fabrics.
The Hypothetical Label : Garment   Origin ….
Fabric   Origin ….
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international trade has become a confrontation between different social and environmental standards as 
well. Obviously, market competition involves goods and services, but different standards mean different 
costs of production, regarding the country where production took place. This leads to two different kinds 
of race: to the bottom, at home, and to the top, abroad. In the former case we try to lower our standards, in 
the latter we try to convince others to raise theirs. The first kind of race is much more theoretical, than 
real, for European industries. This does not mean we have to go on without looking for better efficiency 
at  home.  On  the  contrary,  this  kind  of  search  should  be  the  first  step  for  real  reciprocity  in  trade. 
Otherwise we will have, at the same time, slow economic growth with European consumers paying more 
and more expensive prices.  Unfortunately, today market disruption coming from trade, and especially 




   Utilities Costs in European Textile factories – Source : ATI ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿
 
An additional element that reduces the competitiveness of Italian firms is the lack of some economic 
policies aimed at reinforcing internal efficiency. A  meaningful example  of  Italian inefficiency  is the 
expensiveness of energy utilities, due to a wrong energy policy, a still protected market and a disruptive 
fiscal withdrawal. In the Textile industry the cost of energy utilities represents more than 10% of the 
product value on average. It is made up of electricity, mostly, for spinners and weavers, whereas for 
finishers it is mixed up with thermic energy produced, by the combustion of gas (or oil). Italian Textiles 
enterprises pay energy utilities nearly 30 to 35 per cent more than in other European countries, as shown 
in Figure 17.  
The fiscal drag on Italian enterprises is also disruptive. The so called IRAP is strictly proportional to 
labour costs and paradoxically it works as a sort of incentive to delocalisation. Merger and acquisitions 
between small and medium size enterprises meet in fiscal norms a strong economic set back. For this kind 
of enterprise, which are typical in Italy, bottlenecks in infrastructures and overregulation are becoming 
economically  unsustainable.  When  we  focus  our  attention  on  a  single  sector  we  may  well  miss  the 
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picture. The cause of economic matters, in Italy, are to be found in the system as a whole rather then in 
the single business. 
7) Concluding remarks and summary. 
What might happen to the Italian Textile and Apparel industry? Does it deserve to survive, even if in a 
reduced dimension, or is it going to disappear, simply being a piece of our past without a passport to our 
future? 
Economists will say that this kind of question should be left to the markets. But markets are embedded 
in society and every society is animated by special interests and beliefs. So, some economy decisions 
might be based on social bias and lack of transparency, favouring some interests against others, but not 
producing any invisible hand result. It is not as simple as that. Here, I pointed out these aspects because 
they are not always taken into account. Let’s say that in some circumstances market failure can erupt, 
taking bias as a starting point, without forgetting the importance of the many structural aspects mentioned 
in the paper and hereafter recalled.  
In any case, the Italian economy cannot count on a better future if not through the actual contribution 
of traditional industries. Certainly, we have to modernize our specialisation pattern; but we cannot make 
it  through  a  tabula  rasa  of  our  main  assets  and  of  our  history.  So,  it  is  important  to  face  global 
competition by continuing restructuring, but without disappearing. It is exactly what we have done till 
yesterday,  trading-off  labour  with  capital  intensity,  through  the  magic  of  industrial  districts  and 
innovation.  
I dare say it is too early for the Italian Textile and Apparel industry to be doomed. In fact, it did well 
all through the nineties, when the sectoral trade balance was always positive, whereas  Europe (EU-15) 
had an increasing deficit. Still in 2002, the share of Italy in world exports has been in second place with 
respect to Apparel and in third place for Textile. But it is undeniable that in the last few years the Italian 
Textile and Apparel has been underperforming, as well as all Italian major industries.  
This is due to internal reasons – at national and European level – as well as to external ones. China, 
with its impressive exports dimension and rate of growth is mainly responsible as far as the external 
reasons  is  concerned.  In  fact,  China  is  running  along  a  path  of  economic  specialisation  focused  on 
traditional industries export-led, so that Italy’s main fault seems to be the fact of being still largely 
characterised by the same kind of industries. The debate about this fact appears strongly influenced by a 
deterministic approach to economic development. Without forgetting that the failure of many of the so 
called innovative industries, in Italy, was not caused by the traditional ones (but the other way round).  
In order to make a better approach to these aspects I proposed an historical perspective – which 
deserves to be improved. I referred to some patterns like the one by Akamatsu, the so called : flying 
geese. With reference to this pattern, the Italian Textile and Apparel industry could be seen as a problem 
because  of  its  persistence.  Misunderstanding  the  economic  and  social  reasons  at  the  root  of  this 
persistence could lead to the wrong strategy for the future (or to no strategy at all). Michele Tronconi, Textile and Apparel: an historical and "glo-cal" perspective. … 
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With the end of the quota system the Italian industry is facing market disruption produced by the 
flood of exports from China. Too much, too soon, too cheap.  Italian entrepreneurs are over-reacting to 
this and innovation is no longer regarded as an opportunity to cultivate differential competitive advantage.  
The risk  we are facing in this complex contest is not, simply, a capacity  reduction,  but a rather 
widespread withdrawal. So, what if all this is happening (also) because of market signals artificially 
sustained? In fact, we see, currently, that products coming from China are imported at ever lower prices, 
which, in many cases, hardly exceed the cost of the raw materials they are made up with. What is making 
competition nearly impossible against China exports, due to unbearably low prices, could be split in to 
structural aspects and strategic ones. As a consequence of the first kind of aspects we suffer a sort of 
dumping-effect, due to excess capacity and big differences in social and environmental standards. With 
reference to the strategic aspects, we can quote: public subsidies; currency undervaluation; soft budget 
constraints and counterfeiting. To face this kind of escalating competition from China a few steps should 
be taken, both on a temporary and permanent basis.  
Safeguards measures can be seen as traffic lights to regulate the excess of trade and its consequent 
market disruption. They help to face structural aspects at the base of the Chinese export flood. On the 
other hand, on a more permanent basis, we have to find effective ways of transforming our social and 
environmental  constraints  into  new  competitive  assets.  The  achievement  of  the  life-cycle  thinking 
philosophy that lies at the basis of many European regulations, is not visible to consumers, nor is it a 
purchase driver. To correct all this, more transparency is needed and tools like product traceability and 
mark of origin could be very useful. The actual lack of transparency could also explain why we are not 
having the typical gains from trade, in terms of cheaper prices for many European consumers.  
So, we come back to basic questions: what favours whom? In Latin : Cui prodest?  For example : who 
wants cheap imports, but not transparency? Who is favoured by manufacturing and who is favoured by 
trading, in Italy, as well as in Europe?  
All in all, this is why I proposed an historical and “glo-cal” perspective: to look at real problems 
considering real possibilities, without being diverted by stereotypes and bias. Besides, it is essential that 
every one faces the competitive challenge by doing his own job to the best of his ability. Liuc Papers n. 176, settembre 2005 
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1 This paper takes origin from a presentation held in March 2005 to a classroom of  International Economics at the 
Bocconi University, in Milan. I thanks Paolo Epifani and Fabrizio Onida for the occasion. I would particularly 
like to thank Rodolfo Helg for providing valuable comments. I am grateful to William Lakin and Francesco 
Marchi of Euratex for conversation over the last few month that led to the development of some ideas presented 
thereafter. None of these persons should be held responsible for the views expressed here.     
2 In so doing I have taken the opportunity to point out some issues which I intend to better analyse in the new and 
revisited edition of a previous work. I’m referring to : “Quale strategia per l’industria tessile. SEA, Como, 2003”. 
3 Only to give you an idea of my way of thinking, I would like to express some personal beliefs with respect to the 
economic system in general. First of all, I believe that markets are embedded in society. This means a lot of 
things;  for  example  that  history,  institutions,  norms,  politics  and  belief  do  matter.  Moreover,  it  means  that 
individuals are influenced by the choices of others. Secondly, and in some respects, consequently, I believe that 
real persons pursue their interests with a bounded rationality, strongly influenced by general belief and norms, as 
well as by the lack of  information. 
4 MFA, stands for: Multi-Fiber Arrangement; ATC, stands for: Agreement on Textile and Clothing. 
5 It is generally understood that prices tend to decrease when quotas are eliminated. In fact, import under quantitative 
restrictions tends to be only in the higher quality segment, instead of the complete range, from cheaper to the 
most expensive ones. As soon as quotas are eliminated, imports go to cover the whole range, reaching a lower 
average  price.  Nonetheless,  this  doesn’t  seem  the  case  for  textile  and  apparel  products  coming from  China, 
because production remain focused on large scale products. 
6 In that period, spinning was the bottleneck, as it took the output of upwards of five spinners to supply one hand 
loom. 
7 The transition to the factory system represented a controversial issue for scholars about main causes. See, for 
example, R. Langlois, 1997 and J. Mokyr, 2002.   
8 J. Mokyr stressed the possibility that this happened as a way to cope with the strong reactions of French highly 
specialised craftsmen, in defence of their status (Mokyr, 1995). 
9 There is another anomaly which I’d like to stress. Textiles and Apparel, in Italy, is a local concentrated industry. 
The flying geese pattern could suggest that this industry should be located in the less developed areas of the 
country, whereas it is exactly the opposite. Lombardy which is one of the most developed regions, not only in 
Italy but in all Europe, has the higher presence of Textiles and Apparel firms. In fact, starting from last ISTAT 
census data (2001), nearly 20% of Italian units are placed in Lombardy, with 169.000 of people employed, which 
represent the 28% of the total employment in the sector. Nonetheless, there is a fact which is consistent with the 
higher  development  of the region.  The kind  of industries  located in Lombardy  tend  to be  the  more capital 
intensive, operating in spinning, weaving and finishing, much more than in clothing. But this doesn’t resolve the 
question about the persistence of a traditional industry among many innovative ones. 
10 The argument against artificial distortion of market prices is usually used with reference to protectionist policies. 
All in all, we could assume that every kind of “artificial” intervention tends to produce a similar effect: they 
distort prices and therefore economic incentives. Even though, this leaves an open question. What do we have to 
consider as “artificial”?  
11 With an apparent consumption of at least 387,5 Billion Euro in 2003, the EU-25 is the largest world market for 
textile and clothing products. 
12 This is not in favour of my objectivity, because so much was due to my special interest. But I think that there isn’t 
a better way to approach every question where dumping is supposed to occur, due to the different and conflicting 
interests at stake. The same question, considered from one side or the other, can be illegal and harmful, or legal 
and convenient. And this can occur without even leaving the domestic market. 
13 J. Viner is quoted in G. Niels, 2000. 
14 Other elements to be taken in due consideration are the structure of the industry in terms of numbers of rivals and  
barriers to entry. These are usually very low in the case of  un-concentrated industry. And without barriers to 
entry, predatory pricing is unlikely to happen because even if a foreign firm drives rivals out of business, it 
cannot raise prices to finance the losses sustained in the price war if other firms can simply re-enter the market, 
once prices go up.   
15 This paragraph is taken by a previous a work: “The environmental performance of EU Industry. The Textile case.” 
Brussels, 25/11/2003. 